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Homomorphic encryption from codes
Andrej Bogdanov∗ Chin Ho Lee†
Abstract
We propose a new homomorphic encryption scheme based on the hardness of decoding under
independent random noise from certain affine families of codes. Unlike in previous lattice-
based homomorphic encryption schemes, where the message is hidden in the noisy part of the
ciphertext, our scheme carries the message in the affine part of the transformation and applies
noise only to achieve security. Our scheme can tolerate noise of arbitrary magnitude, as long as
the noise vector has sufficiently small hamming weight (and its entries are independent).
Our design achieves “proto-homomorphic” properties in an elementary manner: message
addition and multiplication are emulated by pointwise addition and multiplication of the ci-
phertext vectors. Moreover, the extremely simple nature of our decryption makes the scheme
easily amenable to bootstrapping. However, some complications are caused by the inherent
presence of noticeable encryption error. Our main technical contribution is the development of
two new techniques for handling this error in the homomorphic evaluation process.
We also provide a definitional framework for homomorphic encryption that may be useful
elsewhere.
1 Introduction
Homomorphic encryption was proposed by Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzos [RAD78] over three
decades ago as a mechanism for secure delegation of computation to an honest but curious server.
While some partial progress was made over time, the first such cryptographic schemes were proposed
only a few years ago, starting with the breakthrough work of Gentry [Gen09a, Gen09b].
Since then, several such schemes have been proposed [vDGHV10, BV11, GH11, BGV12]. These
schemes vary widely in their underlying security assumptions as well as the simplicity and efficiency
of the constructions. However at a fundamental level, they all rely on the same idea of hiding
information inside the noise of lattice-based encryptions.
We propose a new way to achieve homomorphic encryption based on codes rather than lattices.
In both code and lattice based cryptosystems, encryptions are obtained by applying an affine trans-
formation to an input and adding some noise. The two differ in the way they encode information.
In lattice based cryptography, the information is encoded inside the noise and the security of the
system relies on the inability to distinguish different noise patterns. In code-based cryptography,
the information is encoded in the input to the affine transformation, while the role of the noise is
to prevent its inversion (and more generally deducing various properties of the input).
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2 Our cryptosystem
Our main result is a construction of a homomorphic public-key encryption scheme from a code-
based public-key encryption scheme with some special properties. The code-based scheme which
is the base of our construction is new. We arrived at it by combining the structure of encryptions
of the local cryptosystem of Applebaum, Barak, and Wigderson [ABW10] with a “key scrambling”
idea of the McEliece cryptosystem [McE78]. We begin by discussing the proposed scheme and give
evidence in favor of its security. The design is motivated by certain algebraic requirements that
enable the implementation of homomorphic operations. We defer the discussion of these special
properties to Section 3.
2.1 The base cryptosystem K
The ciphertexts in our cryptosystem are n-bit vectors over Fq, where q is a power of a prime. Three
additional parameters that enter the description of the cryptosystem are the amount of randomness
r used in the encryption, the size s of the secret key, and the noise distribution η˜ over Fq. We
will discuss the relationships between these parameters shortly. Conjecture 2.1 at the end of this
section summarizes the conclusion of this discussion. The message set of our encryption scheme is
the set Fq.
Public-key encryption scheme K
Key generation: Choose a uniformly random subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size s and an n× r matrix
M from the following distribution. First, choose a set of uniformly random but distinct values
a1, . . . , an from Fq. Set the ith row Mi to
Mi =
{
[ai a
2
i · · · a
s/3
i 0 · · · 0], if i ∈ S,
[ai a
2
i · · · a
s/3
i a
s/3+1
i · · · a
r
i ], if i 6∈ S.
The secret key is the pair (S,M) and the public key is the matrix P =MR, where R is a random
r × r matrix over Fq with determinant one. (Such a matrix can be efficiently sampled.)
Encryption: Given a public key P , to encrypt a message m ∈ Fq, choose a uniformly random
x ∈ Frq and a noise vector e ∈ F
n
q by choosing each of its entries independently at random from η˜.
Output the vector Px+m1+ e, where 1 ∈ Fnq is the all ones vector.
Decryption: Given a secret key (S,M), to decrypt a ciphertext c ∈ Fnq , first find a solution to the
following system of s/3 + 1 linear equations over variables yi ∈ Fq, i ∈ S∑
i∈S yiMi = 0∑
i∈S yi = 1
(1)
with yi = 0 when i 6∈ S. Output the value
∑
i∈[n] yici.
To understand the functionality of this scheme, let us first assume that no noise is present, that
is η˜ always outputs zero. The decryption of an encryption of m is given by
yT (Px+m1) = (yTM)Rx+m · yT1 =
(∑
i∈S
yiMi
)
Rx+m
∑
i∈S
yi = m
2
by the constraints (1) imposed on yi. We must argue that these constraints can be simultaneously
satisfied. This follows from the fact that the matrix specifying the system of equations (1) is an
s× (s/3 + 1) Vandermonde matrix, which has full rank and is therefore left-invertible.
When noise is present in the encryption, the decryption could produce the wrong answer when
at least one of the noisy elements makes it inside the hidden set S. By a union bound this happens
with probability at most ηs, where η = Pr[η˜ 6= 0] is the noise rate of the scheme.
2.2 Relation with the McEliece and ABW cryptosystems
While we are unable to argue the security of our proposed scheme by formal reduction to a previ-
ously studied one, we describe how our scheme combines ideas from the existing cryptosystems of
McEliece and Applebaum, Barak, and Wigderson (ABW), with an eye towards inheriting the se-
curity features of these schemes. We take some small liberties in our discussion of these encryption
schemes in order to emphasize the parallels to our proposed scheme.
In the McEliece cryptosystem based on the Reed-Solomon code, the public key looks exactly
like in our scheme, except that the secret subset S is empty (i.e., s = 0). The syntax and semantics
of the encryption, however, are somewhat different. The message set is Frq and an encryption of
a message x ∈ Frq has the form Px + e, which looks like a noisy codeword of the Reed-Solomon
code.1 Decryption is performed by applying an error-correction algorithm to this codeword. What
prevents the adversary from applying the error-correction himself is the fact that the (randomized)
evaluation points of the Reed-Solomon code are not revealed in the public key, owing to the presence
of the “key scrambling” matrix R.
In our proposed cryptosystem, the vector x ∈ Frq does not represent the message but is used
to randomize the encryption. Since P and M are generator matrices of the same linear code, the
encryption of a message m ∈ Fq can be viewed as an affine shift of a random codeword of this code
by m units in every coordinate. To thwart decoding by inverting this affine transformation, a noise
is injected into some of the coordinates. The ability to decrypt now relies not on the existence of
efficient error-correction for the Reed-Solomon code, but on the trapdoor S. The submatrix MS of
M indexed by the rows of S has a similar structure to the whole matrix M , but on a smaller scale.
The scale s of this “self-similarity” will be chosen small enough so that noise is unlikely to make it
into the codeword coordinates indexed by S, allowing for very simple decoding via linear algebra.
Thus at a structural level, our proposed cryptosystem is quite similar to the ABW cryptosystem.
Besides the superficial difference that the ABW system operates over the field F2 while our system
will be instantiated over a larger field, the main difference is in the choice of the public key matrix
P . In the ABW system, the choice of this matrix is constrained by the fact that the encoding needs
to be performed in a local manner. In our case, we will need M (and therefore P ) to have specific
algebraic structure that enables homomorphic operations.
2.3 Parameters and security
We now turn to arguing the security of our scheme against certain natural attacks. The form
of security that we aim to achieve is the standard notion of (s, ε) (key independent) message
indistinguishability, which asks that for every pair of messages m,m′ ∈ Fq, the encryptions of m
1One security issue is that these ciphertexts are not message indistinguishable.
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and m′ are indistinguishable with advantage ε by circuits of size s that are given the public key,
where the randomness is taken over the choice of keys.2
We describe the attacks at a somewhat informal level in order to gain intuition about the setting
of parameters n, q, r, s, and η for which the proposed scheme could be secure. For convenience in
further discussion, n will play the role of a security parameter and we propose values for the other
parameters in terms of n. Ultimately all of these parameters will be polynomially related to n; the
exact polynomial dependencies, which are chosen with some foresight, are described by a constant
α > 0, whose significance will become apparent in Section 5.1.
Recover the hidden subset S from the public key. A natural attack for the adversary is to
locate or guess the hidden subset S. A brute-force search would go over all
(n
s
)
possible candidates
for S. To obtain non-negligible security, one should choose s to increase asymptotically with n.
Here is a more sophisticated kind of attack that attempts to obtain information about S. A
statistical way to distinguish the rows of P that are indexed by S from the other ones is based on
the dimension of the hidden vectors in the matrix P . For the purposes of describing this attack
we can pretend that P =M , as the attack only relies on the column space of P , which is identical
for the two matrices. One can attempt to locate the rows in MS by calculating the rank of various
k× r submatrices D of M . If D turns out not to be of full rank, then D must contain a vector in S
(for otherwise D would be a Vandermonde matrix and therefore of full rank). By performing such
rank calculations one could expect to find information about the subset S.
In Appendix A we show that for any t× r submatrix D (depending on S) the rank of D is full
with probability at least 1−O(r2/q), unless D contains at least s/3 + 1+max{t− r, 0} rows from
MS . The probability is taken over the random choice of a1, . . . , an in the key generation algorithm.
A simple calculation shows that if D were chosen at random (for any choice of t), it would be rank
deficient with probability at most min{O(r2/q), 1/
(
n
Ω(s)
)
}.
Specifically, if we set s = nα/4 and q on the order of 2n
α
, both of these attacks will require
exponential time, or only yield inverse exponential success probability .
Exploit the special properties of MS in the public key. In our decryption algorithm it was
crucial that the rows of the matrixMS satisfy the constraints of the linear system (1). However this
special structure of MS could be potentially exploited by an adversary. For instance, an adversary
may set up a system of equations analogous to (1), but over all indices of the ciphertext instead only
of those in S. Specifically, the adversary sets up the following system of equations over variables
yi, i ∈ [n]: ∑
i∈[n] yiPi = 0∑
i∈[n] yi = 1.
Notice that the solution space of this system does not change if P is replaced by M , and so in
particular it contains all the solutions to the system (1) (with yi = 0 for i 6∈ S). If the adversary is
lucky, the solution space will contain only the solutions to (1) so by solving the system he would
gain the ability to decrypt.
By choosing r to be sufficiently smaller than n—we set r = n1−α/8—we can ensure that the
system set up by the adversary has abundantly many solutions, most of which will be forced to
have very large hamming weight. Such solutions are useless for the decoding, as long as η is not
trivially small, because the noise in the ciphertext is likely to affect some nonzero coordinates of y.
2Security can be proved even if m and m′ are allowed to depend on the public key, but to avoid some technical
complications in the definitions we present our results with respect to the weaker notion.
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Our homomorphic algorithms rely on one additional property of the matrix MS , namely the
existence of solutions to the more constrained linear system (2) described in Section 3. We can
argue that the analogous attack fails by a similar argument as to the one given here. Generally,
our intuition is that we can handle attacks that exploit the similarity between the matrices M and
(the nonzero part of) MS by choosing the rows-to-columns aspect ratio of M to be substantially
larger than the rows-to-columns aspect ratio of MS , which is constant.
Recover the randomness x used in the encryption. If the noise rate η in the encryption is
too small, the adversary may be able to recover x from, say, an encryption of 0. For instance, if
the noise rate η is smaller than 1/r, then in an encryption of 0 of the form Px+ e it would happen
with constant probability that no noise makes it into the first r bits of the encryption. In that case,
the adversary could recover the randomness by inverting the first r bits of the ciphertext.
We set the noise rate η to 1/n1−α/4. Since r = n1−α/8, it follows that any projection of the bits
of a ciphertext of linear length is likely to contain noise, which would make it exponentially hard
to recover the randomness x.
Taking all these factors into consideration, we are now ready to conjecture the security of our
proposed cryptosystem K.
Conjecture 2.1. For every α > 0 there exists γ > 0 such that the cryptosystem K with parameters
r = n1−α/8, η = 1/n1−α/4, s = nα/4 and q ≥ 2n
α
is (2n
γ
, 2−n
γ
)-message indistinguishable, for all n
that are sufficiently large.
We will use Kq(n) to denote an instantiation of the cryptosystem K with the parameters from
Conjecture 2.1 (except for q which we leave as a free parameter).
2.4 Our main result
For technical simplicity we state our definitions and results in the non-uniform setting. An extension
to the uniform setting, which is more natural for homomorphic encryption, is straightforward.
We chose to work in the simpler non-uniform setting in order to avoid distracting technical and
notational complications.
In our definition of homomorphic encryption we wish to distinguish between the standard de-
cryption algorithm, which applies to encryptions of bits, and the homomorphic decryption algo-
rithm, which applies to the output of the homomorphic evaluation circuit. Also, unlike previous
homomorphic encryption schemes, ours carries the risk of a setup error, which we account for in
the definition.
Owing to this risk of error, it is possible that some of the inputs provided to the homomorphic
evaluation circuit are themselves corrupted. To provide for this possibility, we give a somewhat
more general definition of homomorphic evaluation: Instead of requiring that the circuit works
well on encryptions of the inputs (which are not even well-defined in the setting of error-prone
probabilistic encryption), we ask that they work on inputs that decrypt to the correct value. This
feature of the definition will be very useful in the proofs.
Definition 2.2. A homomorphic encryption scheme with setup error κ for circuit class C =
{C : Bm → B} (where B is a subset of the message set) consists of five circuits (Gen,Enc,Dec,
Eval,HDec), where (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a (probabilistic) public-key encryption scheme (for a for-
mal definition see e.g. [Gol04]), and Eval and HDec are (deterministic) circuits that satisfy
Pr[HDecSK(EvalPK(C, c1, . . . , cm)) = C(m1, . . . ,mm)] ≥ 1− κ
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for every circuit C ∈ C, every message m ∈ {0, 1}m, and every collection of ciphertexts c1, . . . , cm
such that DecSK(ci) = mi for every i. The probability is taken over the choice of keys (SK,PK) ∼
Gen.
Let C : {0, 1}m → {0, 1} be a boolean circuit with binary addition (i.e. XOR) and multiplication
(i.e. AND) gates of fan-in two. The depth of C is the maximum number of gates on a directed path
of C. We let Ccs,d denote the class of such circuits with circuit size cs and depth d.
Our main result is a construction of a “layered” homomorphic encryption scheme HOM based
onK, which is fully described in Section 6. The following theorem summarizes the functionality and
security properties of our scheme. The parameter k controls the setup error and can be instantiated
to any desired value.
Theorem 2.3. Let q ≤ 2n be a power of two. Assume that the public-key encryption Kq(n)
is (s(n), ε(n))-message indistinguishable for every n (where s(n) and 1/ε(n) are nondecreasing
functions of n). Then HOM is a (s(n0.1)−dk ·poly(n), O(dkn1.8ε(n0.1)))-message indistinguishable
homomorphic encryption scheme for Ccs,d with key length at most O(dkn), encryption length O(kn),
encryption error 2−Ω(k), and setup error d · 2−Ω(k).
2.5 Overview of HOM
To begin, in Section 3 we show that the operations of pointwise addition and multiplication al-
ready enjoy certain “proto-homomorphic” properties, which are sufficient to handle one layer of
homomorphic multiplications. We formalize these properties using the new notion of encryption
spaces, which may be a convenient conceptual tool for studying the functionality of homomorphic
encryptions. The analysis relies on the special structure of the matrix M , specifically on the large
redundancy of the constraint system (2).
In Section 4 we give a formal definition of reencryption, a notion crucial (in ours as well as
other) constructions. We prove that proto-homomorphic operations together with secure reencryp-
tion gives secure homomorphic schemes. We apply an idea of Gentry to obtain a reencryption for
our public-key scheme K. Unfortunately, owing to the inherent noise in our encryptions, the reen-
cryption substantially increases the length of ciphertexts, and the resulting homomorphic scheme
has a noticeable setup error.
Section 5 contains the main technical contributions of our work which address these deficiencies.
We first give a secure length-preserving reencryption based on a recursive application of the length-
increasing reencryption from Section 4 which we use to obtain homomorphic noise correction. We
then give a generic mechanism for reducing the setup error, which extends von Neumann’s method
of building reliable circuits from unreliable components [vN56] to the homomorphic setting.
Combining these results, we give the construction ofHOM and prove Theorem 2.3 in Section 6.
3 Encryption spaces and proto-homomorphic operations
Since homomorphism of encryptions is a functionality rather than a security requirement, we feel
that it is useful to decouple the functionality and security properties of the schemes under discussion.
For this purpose we introduce the notion of an encryption space which is concerned with the set-
theoretic properties of encryptions and abstracts away their statistical properties.
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Definition 3.1. An encryption space over message set Σ and ciphertext set Ξ is a triple (Keys,Enc,Dec),
where
• Keys is a set of admissible key pairs (PK,SK),
• EncPK(·) is a function that maps messagesm ∈ Σ into subsets of valid encyptions EncPK(m) ⊆
Ξ, and
• DecSK(·) is a function that maps messages m ∈ Σ into mutually disjoint valid decryptions
DecSK(m) ⊆ Ξ.
with the property that EncPK(m) ⊆ DecSK(m) for every (PK,SK) ∈ Keys and m ∈ Σ.
We will say that a public-key encryption scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec) implements the encryption
space (Keys,Enc,Dec) with encryption error δ if (1) The support of the output distribution of
Gen is contained in Keys; (2) For every m and PK, Pr[EncPK(m) ∈ EncPK(m)] ≥ 1 − δ; and
(3) For every SK and c ∈ DecSK(m), DecSK(c) = m.
An encryption space for K Notice that for the functionality of the scheme K, it only matters
what happens to the part of the ciphertext that falls inside the hidden subset S. Our definition
of the encryption space K = (Keys,Enc,Dec) for K will capture this intuition. However, we
will equip K with an additional property which will be crucial to achieve proto-homomorphic
encryption.
We set Keys to be the support of the key generation algorithm Gen and EncPK(m) to be the
set of all ciphertexts that take valueMx+m1+f , where fi = 0 when i ∈ S and fi can be arbitrary
when i 6∈ S. We define DecSK(m) as the collection of all ciphertexts c that satisfy y
T c = m for
some arbitrary but fixed y that solves the following system of linear equations:∑
i∈S yi(Mi ⊗Mi) = 0∑
i∈S yiMi = 0∑
i∈S yi = 1
(2)
with yi = 0 when i 6∈ S. Here Mi ⊗Mi denotes the tensor product of Mi with itself, which we
view as an s2-dimensional vector (after removing the zero entries) whose (j, k)th entry is ajia
k
i =
aj+ki . Notice that the system (2) is more constrained than the system (1) as it includes additional
equations. These equations will play a crucial role in enabling homomorphic multiplication.
Claim 3.2. K is an encryption space over message set Fq.
Proof. To make sense of the definition of K we must first argue that the system (2) has at least
one solution y. Here is where the structure of the Reed-Solomon code comes in handy: Although
the system (2) has as many as s2 equations, they all repeat the following set of 2s/3+1 equations:∑
i∈S yia
k
i = 0 for k = 1, 2, . . . , 2s/3∑
i∈S yi = 1.
The matrix of this system is an s× (2s/3+1) Vandermonde matrix and is therefore left-invertible,
so the system is guaranteed to have a solution.
The disjointness of the setsDecSK(m) is immediate. We now show thatEncPK(m) ⊆ DecSK(m)
for every m ∈ Fq. Let c be of the formMx+m1+f and let y be any solution to (2). Since y
T f = 0,
we have that
yT c = yT (Mx+m1) =
(∑
i∈S
yiMi
)
x+m
(∑
i∈S
yi
)
= m
which proves the claim.
The next fact follows directly from the definitions of K and K.
Fact 3.3. The encryption scheme K implements the encryption space K with encryption error ηs.
Proto-homomorphic operations We now define the notion of homomorphic and proto-homomorphic
operations on ciphertexts, which plays an important role in homomorphic constructions.
Definition 3.4. Let (Keys,Enc,Dec) be an encryption space with message set Σ and ciphertext
set Ξ. Let ◦ and ⊚ be binary operations on Σ and Ξ, respectively.
• We will say ⊚ is homomorphic for ◦ if for every (PK,SK) ∈ Keys and m,m′ ∈ Fq,
EncPK(m)⊚ EncPK(m
′) ⊆ EncPK(m ◦m
′).
• We will say ⊚ is proto-homomorphic for ◦ if for every (PK,SK) ∈ Keys and m,m′ ∈ Fq,
EncPK(m)⊚ EncPK(m
′) ⊆ DecSK(m ◦m
′).
Here, ⊚ is extended to an operation on sets in the natural way. The definitions extend naturally
to unary operations. Now let ⊕ and ⊙ denote pointwise addition and pointwise multiplication over
F
n
q respectively, and let γ· denote multiplication of a vector in F
n
q by the fixed scalar γ.
Claim 3.5. With respect to the encryption space K, ⊕ is homomorphic for addition, γ· is homo-
morphic for multiplication by the scalar γ, and and ⊙ is proto-homomorphic for multiplication.
Proof. Let c = Mx + m1 + f and c′ = Mx′ + m′1 + f ′, where fi = f
′
i = 0 when i ∈ S. Then
c⊕ c′ =M(x+x′)+ (m+m′)1+(f + f ′), which is in EncPK(m+m
′), proving homomorphism for
additions. Scalar multiplications are similar. For multiplications, let y be any solution to (2) and
notice that
yT (c⊙ c′) =
∑n
i=1
yi(Mx+m1+ f)i(Mx
′ +m′1+ f ′)i
=
∑
i∈S
yi(Mx+m1)i(Mx
′ +m′1)i
=
∑
i∈S
yi(Mi ⊗Mi)
T (x⊗ x′) +m · yTMx′ +m′ · yTMx+mm′ · yT1
= mm′
since by the constraints (2) we have
∑
i∈S yi(Mi ⊗Mi) = 0, y
TM = 0, and yT1 = 1.
Claim 3.5 already enables homomorphic evaluation under K of circuits that have at most one
layer of multiplication gates. To do more, we need a homomorphic way of turning ciphertexts of
the form DecSK(m) into ciphertexts of the form EncPK(m). While we will not achieve this—at
least not under the desired security assumption—in the following sections we will show how to
convert DecSK(m) into EncPK ′(m), where PK
′ is a different public key. We describe this process
of reencryption in the following section.
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4 Reencryption
We now define the functionality and security requirements of reencryption. We then prove a
composition theorem which shows how to obtain homomorphic encryption from reencryption and
a basis of proto-homomorphic operations.
Intuitively, a reencryption circuit takes a decryption under keys (PK,SK) and outputs an en-
cryption under keys (PK ′, SK ′). To do this the circuit will access some auxiliary information about
the secret key SK which will be “hidden” under PK ′. We model this auxiliary information by an
auxiliary key information function I(SK,PK ′). One complication that occurs in our instantiations
of reencryption is that the function I will be randomized, and we will have to account for the
possibility that it produces incorrect information about the key pair.
Definition 4.1. Let E = (Keys,Enc,Dec) and E′ = (Keys′, Enc′,Dec′) be encryption spaces
over the same message set. A (deterministic) circuit ReEncI(·)(·) is a reencryption from E to
E′ with auxiliary key information I and key error κ if for every admissible pair (PK,SK) ∈
Keys, (PK ′, SK ′) ∈ Keys′, every message m and every c ∈ DecSK(m),
PrI [ReEncI(SK,PK ′)(c) ∈ EncPK ′(m)] ≥ 1− κ
where the outer probability is taken only over the randomness of I.
To define security, let E and E′ be encryption schemes that implement E and E′ respec-
tively. We will say ReEnc is (s → s′, ε → ε′)-secure provided that for every pair of mes-
sages m1 and m2, if (PK,EncPK(m1)) and (PK,EncPK(m2)) are (s, ε) indistinguishable, then
(PK,PK ′, I(SK,PK ′),EncPK(m1)) and (PK,PK
′, I(SK,PK ′),EncPK(m2)) are (s
′, ε′) indis-
tinguishable.
We now show how to combine proto-homomorphic operations and reencryption in order to
obtain homomorphic encryption. One small complication is that in our definition of reencryption
we allow that the two schemes E and E′ are different. This is an important feature that will help
us achieve the definition initially. So when we apply d levels of reencryption, we will work with a
chain of public-key encryption schemes E0, . . . ,Ed.
Let E0, . . . ,Ed be public-key encryption schemes so that Ei implements encryption space Ei.
Assume ReEnci is a reencryption from Ei to Ei+1 with auxiliary information Ii.
Let C be a circuit with binary gates, each of which has a homomorphic or proto-homomorphic
implementation in all of the spaces Ei. Abusing terminology, we will call these gates homomorphic
and proto-homomorphic gates, respectively. The proto-homomorphic depth of C is the largest
number of proto-homomorphic gates on any directed path in any circuit in C. Without loss of
generality (by adding some dummy gates), we will assume that the proto-homomorphic gates in
C are layered, i.e. every path in every circuit has exactly the same number of proto-homomorphic
gates. Let C◦cs,d be the class of circuits of size cs and proto-homomorphic depth d.
Homomorphic template T(E0, . . . ,Ed) for C
◦
cs,d
Key generation: Generate key pairs (PKi, SKi) uniformly at random for every i. Generate
auxiliary key information Ii(SKi, PKi+1) uniformly at random for every i. The secret key is
(SK0, SKd). The public key is (PK0, . . . , PKd, I0, . . . , Id−1).
Encryption and decryption are the same as in E0 using the key pair (PK0, SK0).
9
Homomorphic decryption is the same as in Ed using the secret key SKd.
Homomorphic evaluation: Given a layered circuit C, replace every homomorphic gate + of C
by its homomorphic implementation ⊕. At every proto-homomorphic layer i, replace the proto-
homomorphic gates · by their proto-homomorphic implementations ⊙ followed by ReEnci. Add
reencryption gates ReEnc0 to the input level. Perform the evaluations of the ciphertext, using
auxiliary information Ii for ReEnci. Output the resulting ciphertext.
The following two statements capture the functionality and security properties of this scheme;
we omit the easy proofs.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose ReEnci has key error at most κ. Then T(E0, . . . ,Ed) is a homomor-
phic encryption scheme with setup error at most d · κ.
Claim 4.3. Suppose E0 is (s0, ε0)-message indistinguishable and ReEnci is (si → si+1, εi → εi+1)
secure for every i. Then T(E0, . . . ,Ed) is (sd, εd)-message indistinguishable.
4.1 Constructing reencryption
We now give a construction of a reencryption from the family of encryptions Kq(n). Let Kq(n) and
Kq(n
′) be two instantiations of K with a different hardness parameter, specifically with n′ > n. To
simplify notation we will identify the two encryption schemes with their corresponding encryption
spaces.
Our construction of a reencryption from Kq(n) to Kq(n
′) is based on Gentry’s ingenious idea of
homomorphically evaluating the decryption circuit of Kq(n). The decryption circuit in our scheme
is extremely simple as it only uses homomorphic additions. However, one important complication
in our scheme is the possibility of encryption errors. While for a single encryption the likelihood of
an error occurring is small, when we apply the encryption to all the coordinates of the “secret key”
the error becomes substantial. Our choice of parameters for Kq(·) is essential for controlling the
error; it will allow us to tolerate a substantial amount of error provided we choose n′ to be large
enough in terms of n.
We now describe the reencryption. Let y be the designated solution to the system (2), which
specifies the decryption space ofKq(n). Recall that yi = 0 whenever i is outside the hidden subset S.
The auxiliary key information I(SK,PK ′) consists of the encryptions z1 = EncPK ′(y1), . . . , zn =
EncPK ′(yn), where all encryptions are performed independently. Each of these encryptions is a
vector in Fn
′
q . The reencryption is given by
ReEncz1,...,zn(c) = c1z1 + · · ·+ cnzn.
Claim 4.4. ReEnc is a reencryption from Kq(n) to Kq(n
1+α) with auxiliary information I and
key error n−α(1−α)/2.
Proof. Recall that zi has the form M
′xi + yi1 + ei, where ei is an error vector with error rate η
′.
We will say the output of I(PK ′, SK) is good if for all i ∈ [n], all the entries of ei that fall inside
the hidden subset S′ are zero. By a union bound, the probability that I(PK ′, SK) is not good is
at most
η′s′n = n−(1+α)(1−α/4) · n(1+α)(α/4) · n = n−α(1−α)/2.
We now show that if I(PK ′, SK) is good then ReEncI(c) ∈ EncPK ′(m) for every c ∈ DecSK(m).
Recall that EncPK ′(m) contains those ciphertexts that take value M
′
S′x+m1 inside S
′ (for some
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x) and can take arbitrary value outside S′. Since I is good, we know that the projection of zi onto
S′ has the form M ′S′xi + yi1. Therefore the projection of ReEncI(c) to S
′ has the form
∑n
i=1
ci(M
′
S′xi + yi1) =M
′
S′x+ (c
T y)1 =M ′S′x+m1
where x =
∑
cixi.
The following security claim can be derived by a hybrid argument.
Claim 4.5. If Kq(n
′) is (s, ε′)-message indistinguishable then ReEnc is (s → s − poly(n), ε →
ε+ nε′)-secure.
Assume Kq(n) is (s, ε(n))-message indistinguishable for every n, where ε(n) is nonincreas-
ing. Instantiating the template T(E0, . . . ,Ed) with the encryption schemes Ei = Kq(n
(1+α)i),
we obtain a family of homomorphic encryption schemes BASIC(n) for circuits C : Fmq → Fq
with addition, scalar multiplication, and binary multiplication gates of size cs and multiplication
depth d with key length and encryption length O(n(1+α)
d
) and setup error dn−α(1−α)/2 that are
(s− d · poly(n), O(n(1+α)
d−1
ε(n)))-message indistinguishable.
5 Optimizing reencryption
We now describe two transformations to reencryption. The purpose of the first transformation is to
eliminate the blowup in the security parameter in Claim 4.4. The second one is a generic technique
for reducing the key error.
5.1 Improving the key length
Let us revisit the homomorphic scheme BASIC from the previous section. For convenience we will
introduce a change of parameters. After performing d layers of homomorphic multiplication, the
length of the ciphertext went from n0 to n = n
(1+α)d
0 . We will describe a reencryption from Kq(n)
to Kq(n).
What we would like to do is use the transformation from Claim 4.4, but without increasing the
length n. As we noted, this is difficult to do owing to the large amount of encryption error that
accumulates into the auxiliary key information. Now let us attempt to reduce the reencryption
length by moving from Kq(n) to Kq(n0). This appears even less reasonable, as Kq(n0) has even
greater encryption error than Kq(n). But one advantage of working with Kq(n0) is that the
scheme BASIC already allows us to do homomorphic evaluation over its ciphertexts. Our idea is
to apply BASIC to a “correction circuit” CORR whose purpose is to eliminate the encryption
errors introduced when encrypting the secret key information about Kq(n) using Kq(n0).
To carry out this idea, we have to be somewhat careful about the design of CORR. Here, the
value of the parameter α will play an important role. If CORR is too deep the security suffers, as
it is dictated by n0, while the encryption length is n≫ n0. For a careful choice of the parameters,
we can ensure that CORR has constant depth, which will enable us to produce length-preserving
reencryptions of size n with security parameter polynomial in n.
We will assume that q is a power of two. Let d be an even constant (we later set it to 8). Let
(PK,SK) and (PK ′, SK ′) be two admissible key pairs for Kq(n).
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Reencryption. We generate the auxiliary key information as follows. First, sample a sequence of
independent key pairs (PK0, SK0), . . . , (PKd−1, SKd−1), where (PKi, SKi) comes fromGen(n
(1+α)i
0 ).
Let y ∈ Fnq specify the decryption space ofKq(n). The auxiliary information is generated as follows.
Let γ be a generator for the field extension Fq over F2.
1. Encrypt: For each coordinate yi of y, expand as yi = yi0 + γyi1 + . . .+ γ
log q−1yi log q−1 with
yij ∈ {0, 1}. For every i, j, create 2
d independent ciphertexts ckij = EncPK0(yij), where k
ranges from 1 to 2d.
2. Correct: For every i, j, calculate zij = Eval(CORR, c
1
ij , . . . , c
2d
ij ), where Eval is the evalua-
tion algorithm for BASIC when the key generation algorithm is instantiated with the keys
(PK0, SK0), . . . , (PKd−1, SKd−1), (PK
′, SK ′), and CORR : {0, 1}2
d
→ {0, 1} is the circuit
described below.
3. Output: Let zi = zi0 + γzi1 + . . . + γ
log q−1zi log q−1. Output the vector I(SK,PK
′) =
(z1, . . . , zn).
As before, the reencryption procedure is ReEncz1,...,zn(c) = c1z1 + · · ·+ cnzn.
We now describe the correction circuit. The purpose of this circuit is to eliminate the errors
accumulated in the encryption, which suggests using majority. However we also need to have fine
control over the depth of the circuit. Since the errors of various encryptions are independent, it is
natural to use a recursive majority-type construction in order to correct the error from one layer
to the next. For our analysis, it will be convenient to make CORR be a full binary tree of depth
d where d is even and all the gates are of the type G(x, y) = 1 − xy. When restricted over {0, 1}
inputs, this is a NAND tree.
Proposition 5.1. For α ≤ 1/4 and d = 8, ReEnc is a reencryption from Kq(n) to Kq(n) with
auxiliary key information I and key error O(n−0.5).
Proof. With probability dn−α(1−α)/2 over the choice of keys, we know that the circuit Eval makes
no mistake on its input. Let us assume this is the case.
We will show that with probability 1−O(n−0.5), zij ∈ EncPK ′(yij) for every pair (i, j). By the
homomorphic property of additions and scalar multiplications, it follows that zi ∈ EncPK ′(yi) for
all i. The correctness of reencryption then follows by the same argument as in Claim 4.4.
We fix i and j and for notational convenience we write y = yij, z = zij , c
k = ckij . Let yˆ
k
denote the unique value in Fq such that DecSK0(c
k) = yˆk. Since the encryption of the yijs was
performed at error rate η0, it follows that independently for each y, yˆ
k = y with probability 1− η0,
and otherwise yˆk could be an arbitrary element in Fq.
Let us start with the special case d = 2. We will argue that the Pr[z 6∈ EncPK ′(y)] ≤ 6η
2
0 . This
follows from the design of the circuit CORR. If CORR is given four inputs, three of which have
the same value 0 or 1, its output will also have the same value. Therefore the event z 6∈ EncPK ′(y)
can only happen if yˆk 6= y for at least two values of k, which happens with probability at most 6η20 .
By induction on (even values of) d, it follows that in general the event z 6∈ EncPK ′(y) can
happen with probability at most 62
d/2−1η2
d/2
0 . We now take a union bound over all pairs i and j
and conclude that the reencryption is correct with probability at least n(log q)(6η0)
2d/2 .
Now recall that log q ≤ n and n = n
(1+α)d
0 , which gives an error of
n
2(1+α)d
0 (6η0)
2d/2 =
62
d/2
n
(1−α/4)2d/2−2(1+α)d
0
≤
62
d/2
n
(15/16)·2d/2−2·(5/4)d
0
= O(n−3.070 ) = O(n
−0.5)
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for d = 8.
The following claim follows by a standard hybrid argument and we omit the proof.
Claim 5.2. Fix α ≤ 1/4 and d = 8 and assume Kq(n) is (s(n), ε(n))-message indistinguishable for
every n, where ε(n) is nonincreasing. Then for every ε0, ReEnc is (s(n)→ s(n
0.1)−poly(n), ε0 →
ε0 +O(n
1.8 · ε(n0.1))-secure.
5.2 Reducing the key error
The final optimization we perform concerns the key error of reencryption. The key error of the
reencryption ReEnc from the previous section cannot be reduced beyond 1/n. In the homomorphic
template in Section 4, the setup error increases linearly with the number of reencryptions, so we
cannot apply this scheme to circuits of depth larger than n. We now introduce a generic technique
for reducing this error.
Suppose we are given a reencryption ReEnc with key error κ ≤ 1/32. If we apply ReEnc k
times in parallel to the same ciphertext but using independent instantiations of the auxiliary key
information, by large deviation bounds we can expect that with probability 1−2−Ω(k), a significant
majority—say a 15/16 fraction—of the reencryptions will be correct. However, reapplying reen-
cryption over and over again will quickly yield overwhelming error. This calls for a boosting tool of
the following kind: Given k ciphertexts out of which, say, 15/16 represent the same value, output
k ciphertexts out of which a larger majority, say 31/32, now represent that value. We implement
this functionality in a circuit that we call Boost. For later convenience we reencrypt the outputs
of Boost.
Definition 5.3. Let E and E′ be two encryption spaces over the same message set and (PK,SK),
(PK ′, SK ′) be a pair of admissible keys from the respective spaces. A booster of length k from
E to E′ with auxiliary key information I(SK,PK ′) and key error κ is a circuit Boost with the
following property. For every message m ∈ {0, 1} and ciphertexts c1, . . . , ck out of which at least
15k/16 belong to DecSK(m), BoostI(SK,PK ′)(c1, . . . , ck) outputs ciphertexts c
′
1, . . . , c
′
k out of which
at least 31k/32 belong to EncPK ′(m).
We emphasize that we only require the definition holds for messages m ∈ {0, 1}, and not arbi-
trary messages in Fq. The security definition for boosters is identical to the one for reencryptions.
Our construction of boosters is based on von Neumann’s idea of robust evaluation of circuits
with faulty gates [vN56]. Let G be a bipartite expander graph with k vertices on each side. The
circuit Boost will apply G to its inputs and perform a homomorphic majority at each output.
Computing each of these homomorphic majorities may require some reencryptions. The auxiliary
key information in each of these reencryptions will be independent, ensuring that with very high
probability few errors will be introduced in the reencryption.
The construction Assume E is an encryption scheme equipped with ⊕, ⊙ and reencryption
ReEnc over ciphertexts of length n. Let G be an (n, b, λ = 1/32) spectral expander [HLW06] for a
sufficiently large constant b, and let APXMAJb : F
b
q → Fq be a circuit of depth that depends only
on b (not on q) so that
APXMAJb(x1, . . . , xb) =
{
0, if at least 7b/8 of the inputs are 0,
1, if at least 7b/8 of the inputs are 1.
(3)
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In Appendix B we show the existence of such a circuit of size O(b2) and depth b′ = O(log b).
Auxiliary key information I(SK,PK ′): Repeat the following independently b′ times, once for
every output j of Boost: First, generate a sequence of keys (PKj1 , SK
j
1), . . . , (PK
j
b′−1, SK
j
b′−1) and
set SK = SKj0 , PK
′ = PKjb′ . Output I
′(SKji , PK
j
i+1) for every i and j, where I
′ is the auxiliary
key information for ReEnc.
The circuit Boost: Suppose that output j of G is connected to inputs j1, . . . , jb. For every output
j, apply the homomorphic evaluation to the circuit APXMAJb on inputs cj1 , . . . , cjb as described
in Section 4, but using the auxiliary key information with superscript j, and with an extra round
of reencryptions at the output.
Proposition 5.4. Assume ReEnc is a reencryption whose key error κ is a sufficiently small
absolute constant (independent of n). Then Boost is a booster with key error 2−Ω(k).
Proof. By Proposition 4.2, each of the homomorphic majority circuits has setup error at most
O(κ log b). Since these setup errors are independent, by Chernoff bounds the chances that more
than k/64 is at most 2−Ω(k). Let us assume this is not the case.
Now let B be the set of inputs of G whose value is different from m ∈ {0, 1}. By assumption,
|B| ≤ k/16. Let S be the set of outputs of G that connect to more than b/8 inputs inside
B. Then there are at least |S|b/8 edges between S and B. By the expander mixing lemma,
|S|/8k ≤ |S|/16k + λ
√
|S|/16k, from where |S| ≤ 16λ2k ≤ k/64 by our choice of λ.
It follows that at most k/64 + k/64 = k/32 outputs of Boost will decrypt incorrectly with
probability at most 1− 2−Ω(k).
We now state the security of this construction.
Claim 5.5. If ReEnc is (s → s′, ε0 → ε0 + ε)-secure, then Boost is (s → s
′ − k · poly(n), ε0 →
ε0 +O(kε))-secure.
6 The scheme HOM
To obtain our scheme HOM, we will apply the homomorphic template of Section 4 to k parallel
copies of the base scheme Kq(n), using the booster from Section 5.2 to perform reencryptions. Let
n denote the security parameter.
Let Kkq (n) denote the following scheme over message set Fq and ciphertext set F
kn
q . The key
generation algorithm is the same as in Kq(n). To encrypt a message m, we output k independent
encryptions of m in Kq(n). To decrypt a ciphertext c1 . . . ck, we apply the decryption of Kq(n) on
each ci and output the most frequent answer.
Let K = (Keys,Enc,Dec) denote the encryption space for Kq(n) from Section 3. We now
define an encryption spaceKk = (Keys,Enck,Deck) forKkq (n). We let Enc
k
PK(m) consists of those
ciphertexts c1 . . . ck for which ci ∈ EncPK(m) for at least 31k/32 values of i. We let Dec
k
SK(m)
consists of those ciphertexts c1 . . . ck for which ci ∈ DecSK(m) for at least 15k/16 values of i.
It is easy to see that if K is an encryption space for Kq(n) with encryption error 1/64, then
Kk is an encryption space for Kkq (n) with encryption error 2
−Ω(k). The error follows from a large
deviation bound.
It is also easy to see that pointwise addition ⊕ and pointwise multiplication ⊙ are proto-
homomorphic over message set {0, 1} with respect toKk. Notice that although ⊕ was homomorphic
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for K, it is merely proto-homomorphic for Kk, owing to the possibility of erroneous encryptions in
Enck.
Finally, notice that the booster Boost from Section 5.2 (instantiated with the length-preserving
reencryption ReEnc from Section 5.1) is a reencryption for Kk. Now define
HOM = T(Kkq (n), . . . ,K
k
q (n)) with reencryption Boost
where T is the homomorphic template from Section 4. The following two claims prove Theorem 2.3.
Claim 6.1. The scheme HOM is a homomorphic encryption scheme for Ccs,d with key length
O(dkn) and setup error d · 2−Ω(k).
This claim follows directly froms Proposition 4.2 and Proposition 5.4.
Claim 6.2. Assume Kq(n) (with α ≤ 1/4) is (s(n), ε(n))-message indistinguishable, where s(n)
and 1/ε(n) are nondecreasing. Then HOM is (s(n0.1) − dk · poly(n), O(dkn1.8ε(n0.1)))-message
indistinguishable.
This claim follows by combining Claims 4.3, 5.2, and 5.5.
7 Conclusion
In this work we propose a new public-key encryption system that is inspired by the conjectured
hardness of decoding noisy codewords from certain affine codes with a planted trapdoor. We argue
the security of this system and give a construction of a secure homomorphic encryption scheme
based on it.
To evaluate a circuit of depth d, our scheme requires keys of size O((d log d)n), where n is the
security parameter. It would be good if this dependence of d in the key length was eliminated. One
important tool in our analysis is the length-preserving reencryption circuit from Section 4. There
we proved that reencryption is secure provided it is used on independent key pairs. It is tempting
to instantiate this construction over the same key pair, in the spirit of “circular security” prevalent
in other works on homomorphic encryption. This would indeed eliminate the dependence on d (and
also obviate the need for reducing the key error).
While we do not know if the suggested circular security assumption is valid or not, we are
uncomfortable conjecturing it for the following reason. In the auxiliary key information, every one
of the n elements yi of the “secret key vector” y is encoded by a ciphertext ci of length n, so that
all the ciphertexts decode without error. In view of the simplicity of our decryptions, we feel that
if such a property holds at all, it should be achievable by direct construction (possibly using other
reasonable security assumptions) rather than the somewhat complex mechanism of Section 4. We
were not able to come up with such a direct construction without suffering a security flaw.
Our initial motivation for this research was to better understand the complexity required for
homomorphic encryption. Owing to the simplicity of its encryption, the scheme of Applebaum et
al. was a natural starting point for this study. Many of the techniques developed here can be
applied to that scheme. However, we were unable to design a secure length-preserving reencryption
for that scheme. In short, the reason is that the system of equations analogous to (2) for that
scheme does not enjoy a sufficient amount of redundancy, which severely limits the choice of α.
We recently learned of an independent attempt by Armknecht et al. [AAPS11] to construct
a code-based homomorphic encryption scheme. Their scheme achieves only some rudimentary
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homomorphic properties and is not public-key. However it appears some of their ideas (for example,
the use of pointwise operations on ciphertexts) are related to ours and it would be interesting to
see if they can be applied towards future improvements.
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A The ranks of submatrices of the public key
We prove the following proposition, which points to the limitation of an attack on the public key
of M described in the introduction.
Proposition A.1. Let T ⊆ [n], |T | = t be an arbitrary subset of rows of the r×n public key matrix
P such that |T ∩S| ≤ s/3+max{t−r, 0}. Then the submatrix PT of P spanned by the rows indexed
by T has full rank with probability at least 1 − O(r2/q), where the randomness is taken over the
choice of a1, . . . , an in the key generation algorithm.
Proof. We prove the theorem for the matrix M instead of P . Since P andM have the same column
space and the rank of PT is a property of the column space of P projected to the coordinates in T ,
the statement will follow.
Without loss of generality we may assume that MT is a square matrix: If t < r we can augment
the MT by rows from outside S, and if t > r, we can eliminate rows from MT that come from S
(and some extra ones if necessary). Both operations preserve rank deficiency.
Now supposeMT is a square matrix so that at most s/3 of its rows come from S. Let us assume,
again without loss of generality, that T = {1, . . . , r} and S = {1, . . . , s0}, s0 ≤ s/3. We now argue
that with probability 1−O(r2/q), the determinant det(MT ) is nonzero.
Notice that det(MT ) is a formal polynomial in the variables a1, . . . , ar of degree at most 1 +
2 + · · · + r = r(r + 1)/2. In our setup, the diagonal term a1a
2
2 . . . a
r
r appears uniquely in the
sum-product expansion of the determinant, and so this formal polynomial is nonzero. By the
Schwarz-Zippel lemma, if a1, . . . , ar were chosen independently at random from Fq, det(MT ) would
be zero with probability at most 1−r(r+1)/2q. Our ai are not independent since they are required
to be distinct, but the statistical distance between r uniformly independent elements of Fq and r
uniform but distinct elements of Fq is only O(r
2/q). It follows that det(MT ) 6= 0 with probability
1−O(r2/q).
B Approximate 0, 1-majorities over arbitrary fields
In this section we prove the following claim.
Proposition B.1. Let q be the power of a prime. There exists a circuit APXMAJm : F
m
q → Fq
of size O(m2) and depth O(logm) with the property (3).
The challenge is to make the depth of the circuit independent of q. We show an easy construction
based on a trick of Valiant [Val84].
Proof. Let CORRd be the correction circuit from Section 5.1 where d = 2 logm+4. We will show
that there exists a way to connect the m inputs to the 2d inputs of CORRd in a way that the
resulting circuit computes APXMAJm.
Fix a specific input x so that at least 7/8 of its elements equal b. If each of the inputs to
CORRd is randomly wired to one of the elements in x, then the inputs to CORRd will take value
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b independently with probability at least 7/8 each. Recall that for b ∈ {0, 1}, if each of the inputs
to this circuit takes value b with probability 7/8, then its output takes value b with probability
1 − (3/4)2
d/2
> 1 − 2−m by our choice of d. Taking a union bound over all such inputs x, we
conclude that there must exist a wiring with the desired property.
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